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In his admirable book The Gift of Death Jacques Derrida​[1]​ has paid a tribute to the too often neglected Czech philosopher and phenomenologist Jan Patočka. It is a good thing that Derrida has given this attention to Patočka and to the importance of his work for a philosophical reflection on responsibility. His interpretation of Patočka’s work, however, especially of the fifth of Patočka’s Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History,​[2]​ is highly problematic. In this article I shall discuss and compare the thoughts of Patočka on responsibility (§ 1), Derrida’s interpretation of Patočka (§ 2) as well as his own ideas of responsibility (§ 3); then a critical evaluation will be given of Derrida’s thoughts of responsibility, with the help of, among other arguments, some ideas of Patočka (§ 4 and 5).


1. Patočka on responsibility

Although he nowhere explicitly dedicates a book or a study to the idea of responsibility, this idea is of great importance in the work of Patočka. His philosophical reflections on responsibility find their point of departure in Husserl’s idea of a ‘life-world’ (Lebenswelt). In contrast with Husserl, however, Patočka is not focusing on an explanation of the cognitive elements in the life-world of human conscience, which would then have to serve as a foundation for scientific knowledge. Following Heidegger, he emphasizes the practical relations of human existence to the surrounding world and phenomena. This switch to an existential phenomenology, however, is not directed by the question of being, as is the case in Heidegger, but by the interest in human existence as such. One of the most prominent contributions of Patočka to phenomenology can be found in his analysis of the basic layers of this existence, what he calls the ‘three movements of human existence in the life-world’.​[3]​
	Patočka does not understand human existence as something static, but as constantly being in movement, a ‘being-in-the-world’ in which being should be taken as a verb. The first movement is that of anchoring: a bodily, instinctively and affectively being rooted and rooting in a natural environment and in a community. Anchoring is a safe alliance with the world around us that is presupposed in all later activities of man, an embeddedness without which a human being cannot exist. Secondly, Patočka distinguishes the movement of reproduction or self-projection: one has to work to keep oneself alive. This movement takes place in functional relations with the world. Patočka describes labor as an activity that is characteristic for this second movement. The third movement is the most important one, namely, the movement of breakthrough or truth. Man enters a relationship with the world and its horizon as such, with the world as a totality, and also with his own existence as such, that is with his finiteness and death. His relations to the world and to his own existence become explicit. In this openness for the world an authentic (eigentlich) human existence can be developed, an existence that is characterized by freedom and responsibility. 
	The beginning of this third movement involves a shock and a sudden change. It becomes clear that the hitherto given structures of the world and the related roles of human existence are not as evident as they seemed to be in the first two movements: they are changeable, variable and open for discussion. The traditional order is undermined forever. Human existence and the world as a totality are not given as phenomena but arise as a question. They go together with the astonishment and wonder that since antiquity is experienced as the beginning of philosophy. From now on man can no longer simply fall back on conventions and authorities. He becomes receptive to new perspectives on phenomena and is forced to adopt his own authentic attitude and position towards his own existence as well as towards his environment. The beginning of the third movement is a change that is comparable with the Heideggerian turn from inauthentic to authentic life. From now on the choices that are made have to be accounted for. The new openness and receptivity for the world is constitutive for freedom and responsibility. Therefore the third movement of human existence is not only the beginning of philosophy but also the beginning of ethics and politics. In contrast with Husserl and Heidegger, Patočka develops the idea of a life-world immediately as an ethical and political issue.​[4]​
	The life-world and its horizon are given as a problem and as a question. The question of the meaning of the world and of human existence starts with the collapse of its answers, with meaninglessness. This question cannot be answered by a metaphysical origin of meaning, for such an origin cannot appear to us as a phenomenon. It cannot appear without the aporia in which this origin functions as a condition of the world and as a conditioned phenomenon within the world.​[5]​ The meaning of being therefore can only be thought within the quest for meaning that will always remain a secret and object of discussion. The question remains a question. In this regard, Patočka speaks of ‘negative Platonism’, the awareness of the importance of metaphysical questions combined with the inability to provide a definitive answer. According to Patočka, this quest contains itself the meaning of human existence and the meaning of history.​[6]​
	This implies that freedom and responsibility are historical, they have an open-ended history – and they also are the meaning of history. Just like Husserl, Patočka offers Europe a central place in this history. In his view, European culture has a universal meaning and is determining for world history. The cradle of European history and civilization and the beginning of history as such can be found in Greece. The Greek polis and Greek philosophy form the turn from prehistorical and mythical life to a free and responsible existence that is able to raise the question of the world as a totality: the turn from prehistory to history, from myth to philosophy and religion, from restraint to freedom and responsibility.​[7]​ Socrates and Plato are central figures in Patočka’s analyses. According to Patočka, their concern for the ‘care of the soul’ builds up the kernel of European culture. The care of the soul stands for the development of a way of life that is dedicated to truth, authenticity and responsibility.​[8]​ The history of Europe is the history of the care of the soul and also the history of philosophy, responsibility and politics. Since its birth in ancient Greek culture, it finds its first highlight in the thoughts of Socrates and Plato, and then develops through Roman culture and Christianity. 
	In his Heretical Essays, Patočka discerns two turns or conversions within the history of responsibility: the turn from mythical life to Platonism and the turn from Platonism to Christianity. The first turn overlaps the third movement of human existence, the disclosure of an awareness of the totality of being and of human existence as such. It takes place in the incorporation of the sacred mysteries of the mystical world with its orgiastic and demonic cults where no personal responsibility is possible, in the Platonic idea of the immortal soul that seeks its orientation towards an absolute Good, the Good beyond being. The second turn is the displacement of the Idea of the Good by the Christian idea of a personal God who has an interior relation with a singular human person. Although in Christianity philosophy is made subordinate to a divine revelation, this is not a matter of blind mythical belief but of cooperation of human beings in the realization of a given meaning. In Patočka’s view, Christianity remains “…the greatest, unsurpassed but also un-thought-through human outreach that enabled humans to struggle against decadence.”​[9]​ 
	Modernity, on the other hand, is described by Patočka as a period of decay. Modern science and technology approach phenomena as a totality of controllable beings and thereby bear the threat of falling back into a culture in which the second movement of human existence prevails: a culture that takes the world and all what is in it, as tools that can be functional in the development and identification of the self. This leads to a culture that is characterized by scientific and technological objectivism, materialism and professionalism, boredom and decadence, to an existence that pays no attention anymore for a care of the soul and a ‘living in truth’.​[10]​
	To escape this modern materialism and decadence, European culture and history is in need of a rediscovery and a new elaboration of the care of the soul. This implies new attention to the ‘third movement of human existence’, the authentic relation to the totality of the world and to finite human existence as an unanswerable question. Ethics and responsibility are not just articulations of a given set of norms and rules but can only be thought in terms of accounting and justification of moral decisions and convictions that are far from self-evident. Accordingly, politics is not the maintenance of a given social order or the implementation of a blueprint for the future, but finds its departure in a responsible ‘living in truth’ that is shared in the ‘solidarity of the shaken’, the solidarity of those who share the awareness of finiteness and a certain ignorance.​[11]​


2. Derrida’s reading of Patočka

In The Gift of Death Derrida does not address the distinction between the three movements of human existence. He concentrates his reading on the historical development to and within the third movement: the development of the care of the soul from the Greek myths through Platonism and Christianity. Derrida describes this development in terms of mystery and religion, limiting his interpretation primarily to Patočka’s fifth ‘heretical essay’: the above-mentioned incorporation of the sacred orgiastic mystery in the Platonic idea of the immortal soul and the suppression of this orgiastic mystery by the Christian faith in a personal God. Derrida underlines that both incorporation and suppression can never be completely successful; there will always be something left of the suppressed culture and religion that remains active within its new framework. Another emphasis in Derrida’s interpretation stresses that in all three periods man is related to a secret he cannot control or survey.
	Most of all, Derrida directs his attention to Patočka’s reproduction of the Christian concept of responsibility. The main difference, according to Patočka, between Platonism and Christianity consists in the Good towards which moral actions and decisions aim themselves. In Plato this is the transcendent Idea of the Good that is sought through knowledge, contemplation and development of personal virtues. In Christianity the Good can be found in a personal relation to God, who ‘holds the interior of man in his hand’, who can see form the inside without being seen, who gives his life in self-forgetful goodness and infinite self-denying love. Faced with this infinite love, man will always remain owing and sinful – this is the origin of responsibility. The secretive and mysterious relation to this infinitely loving God, who knows man better than he knows himself, is named by Patočka as mysterium tremendum. The mysterium tremendum is a gift of death: God becomes finite and gives his death, i.e. gives his life, sacrifices himself for man, in an act of infinite love.​[12]​ Human finiteness, singularity and irreplaceable responsibility can only be properly understood against the background of this infinite love.​[13]​
	Derrida interprets this reproduction of a Christian concept of responsibility as if it is Patočka’s own idea of responsibility. To be more precise, according to Derrida it doesn’t really matter whether Patočka’s text is essentially Christian or not.​[14]​ But at the same time he interprets this text as developing a Christian idea of responsibility – this is the first major problem of Derrida’s reading of Patočka. The Heretical Essays do not give any justification for this equation of Patočka’s description of Christian responsibility and his own view of responsibility. Although Patočka writes that Christianity offers the “greatest and unsurpassed effort to struggle against decline, he nowhere subscribes to it. As far as he develops his own view on history and responsibility, he emphasizes that responsibility is dependent on the openness of history and on the fact that fundamental questions will never be definitely answered.​[15]​
	One of the paradoxes of Derrida’s interpretation is that he first changes Patočka’s thought into a Christian thought and then tries to undo his idea of responsibility from any Christian content. Derrida reads Patočka’s essays as a non-dogmatic doubling of religious dogmas, a doubling that repeats the general logical structure of Christian thought, its ‘logic at bottom’, without any dogma or religious conviction.​[16]​ In general, this characterization of Patočka’s work is quite right: Patočka’s work can very well be interpreted as a non-Christian thinking through of the Christian tradition; his view of responsibility is very religious, but without any dogma. But the excavation of the mysterium tremendum that Derrida undertakes in his reading, results, as we shall see, in a concept of responsibility that is quite different from both Patočka’s idea of responsibility and his description of a Christian concept of responsibility.
	The movement of excavation is typical for Derrida’s later work on ethics and religion. It is a movement from revelation to revealability: an effort to reduce a religious revelation to the general structure that renders a revelation possible, a structure in which a revelation can take place. This effort, however, can never succeed, because the opposite can always be thought as well: revealability as conditioned by a specific historical revelation. Moreover, the general structure of revealability can only be articulated in the language of a historical tradition.​[17]​ Derrida’s conceptualization of responsibility shows the same characteristics. On the one hand, Derrida tries to analyze as purely and formally as possible the structure and conditions of possibility of justice and responsibility, thereby abstracting from any concrete content, supposing that a philosophical analysis of these concepts should not be tied to any religious, cultural or political tradition, especially not to a Christian tradition. On the other hand, he insists that a pure universal structure of responsibility as such can never be found, because it is a historical concept, developed and inscribed in religious traditions – there is no form without content. Every description of a pure condition of responsibility can only use the vocabulary of an ethical tradition that always happens to be a religious tradition as well. This is also apparent in Derrida’s interpretation of the eschatological structure of several modern philosophies: they are all forms of messianism, while Derrida’s abstracting excavation in the direction of a general messianic structure can never be completed.​[18]​
	How does Derrida distil out of Patočka’s discourse a general structure of responsibility? In the fifth Heretical Essay, in Patočka’s description of Christian responsibility that he takes to be Patočka’s own view of responsibility, he looks for the conditions of possibility of responsibility. Let us first take a look at this passage in Patočka’s text:

“The responsible human as such is I; it is an individual that is not identical with any role it could possibly assume – in Plato this is expressed in the myth of the drawing of life’s lot; it is a responsible I in the confrontation with death and in coming to terms with nothingness it takes upon itself what we all must carry out in ourselves, where no one can take our place. Now, however, individuality is vested in a relation to an infinite love and humans are individuals because they are guilty, and always guilty, with respect to it. We all, as individuals, are defined by the uniqueness of our individual placement in the university of sin.”​[19]​

In this passage Derrida finds two conditions. First of all, responsibility requires an irreplaceable singularity: responsibility is my own responsibility that I cannot pass onto someone else. This irreplaceability of the responsible subject can be found in the facing of one’s own death. Only a mortal can be responsible. The second condition is the call that summons my responsibility. This is not a Platonic objective and rational Good, but a gift of infinite love, a love that forgets and denies itself. These conditions together form a structural disproportion, a dissymmetry between a finite mortal on the one hand and the goodness of an infinite gift on the other hand. Responsibility appears to be original guilt: the actions and decisions of a responsible human being will never be able to meet the excessive measure of infinite goodness. My death gives me my singularity, but makes me at the same time unequal with regard to the immeasurable goodness of the gift that is the first call to responsibility. Derrida situates this aporia in the heart of every responsibility.
	This interpretation, however, is more than a formalization of Patočka’s description of a Christian concept of responsibility; in this interpretation an important and double displacement takes place. The divine goodness of infinite love that is given to man, is changed into the goodness of an absolute gift that forgets itself and its own origin, a good gift beyond any possible calculation, beyond any trace or shadow of trade, economy or reciprocity. In addition, this gift of infinite love now requests an absolute goodness from a finite and responsible human being:

“Guilt is inherent in responsibility because responsibility is always unequal to itself: one is never responsible enough. One is never responsible enough because one is finite but also because responsibility requires two contradictory movements. It requires one to respond as oneself and as irreplaceable singularity, to answer for what one does, says, gives; but it also requires that, being good and through goodness, one forget or efface the origin of what one gives. Patočka doesn’t say that in so many words, and I am stretching things a little further than he or the letter of his text would allow. But it is he who deduces guilt and sin – and so repentance, sacrifice, and the seeking of salvation – from the situation of the responsible individual.” (my italics, translation slightly changed, E.E.)​[20]​

Derrida’s interpretation of an internal contradiction in responsibility indeed stretches Patočka’s text further than the letter of his text allows. Patočka writes that the Christian concept of responsibility consists in the fact that a mortal human being remains guilty towards infinite love. He describes the goodness of infinite love as a goodness that renounces, forgets and denies itself. Apart from the question of how far this can be taken as Patočka’s own view, this description is better interpreted as a self-denial in service of the other, an attitude that is not necessarily equal to an absolute gift without any possible calculation. More important, Patočka only writes about an infinite goodness that is given to man and that man’s responsibility as a response to this infinite goodness, remains in default. He does not write that man is called to give with the same divine infinite goodness – and that is what Derrida makes of it.
	In short, Derrida not only reveals the ‘logic at bottom’ of Patočka’s text, he turns this logic into his (Derrida’s) own ideas of responsibility. Derrida admits this in the quotation given above, but he adds to this that it is Patočka himself “…who deduces guilt and sin […] from the situation of the responsible individual.” But this statement is problematic as well, because in fact Patočka is doing the opposite: in the Christian view, responsibility is, together with guilt and sin, deduced from infinite love.


3. Derrida on the aporias of responsibility

The ethical dimension of Derrida’s work has a great similarity with the ethics of Levinas.​[21]​ It is neither an ethical theory nor an elaboration of moral principles, but regards the transcendental question for the conditions of (im)possibility of ethics, politics, law, etc.. It is this quasi-transcendental level of ethics that Derrida wants to broach in his excavation of Patočka’s discourse unto its ‘logic at bottom’. For this domain of questions Derrida sometimes uses terms like ‘ultra-ethics’, ‘ethicity’ and ‘ethics of ethics’.​[22]​
	In Derrida’s view, responsibility is summoned by the call of a singular alterity. A responsible response to this call asks for laws and rules, prescriptions and procedures; without them an arbitrariness would reign that is not compatible with ethics. But the singularity of the other will always again break through the general laws and procedures by which ethics is constructed. According to Derrida ethics can only exist in this tension between the general and the singular. Derrida takes justice as the ideal utopian situation in which a completely satisfying answer can be given to the call of the other, a situation in which nothing is excluded by general laws. Deconstruction takes place between justice and law; it makes an endless oscillatory movement from the laws to justice and back. This is also the movement of différance: justice will always be different from and deferred by the enforcement of law. Since justice is postponed incessantly, always remaining to come, it can only be prefigured through aporias and double binds.​[23]​
	The oscillatory movement of deconstruction between justice and law is a movement between two extremes, a movement between on the one hand an absolute and indeterminable idea of justice, and on the other hand a calculation in the exact interpretation of a written law and in an economics of give and take. It presupposes an ‘all-or-nothing-logics’ of ‘either-or’: there are either restricting rules and procedures or universal and indefinable justice; either calculation or aporetic decision. Since neither of these two alternatives can be given, ethics has to be thematized as captured in an irreducible tension between rational calculation and madness – a tension that is expressed in undecidable aporias.​[24]​ This implies that we can never be good enough, that we can never have a ‘good conscience’; we will never achieve a situation where we can say that we have fulfilled all our responsibilities.
	Consequently, responsibility is always more than just following a rule. Otherwise it would be calculation, calcul, strongly rejected by Derrida as irresponsible. A moral decision will not only follow rules but also bring these rules under discussion, in order to judge them by an ideal of justice. But since a rule cannot be founded, the justification requests an infinite argumentation – which makes responsibility and moral decision impossible. Therefore justice asks for infinite calculation and reasoning of the calculable (law) and the incalculable (justice). Every obligation (devoir) is exceeded by an ‘over-obligation’ (sur-devoir) that transcends the obligation that is summoned by a moral rule. This makes responsibility excessive: no responsibility without unsolvable aporias, no decision without the experience of undecidibility.​[25]​ 
	Moreover, there are additional others to whom I owe a moral account, even a whole lot. According to Derrida, no line can be drawn here. There is no reliable way to set any boundaries to my responsibility. The infinity of my responsibility also means that I am responsible for everyone and everything. Indeed Derrida’s philosophy is getting excessive here. In The Gift of Death he gives an astonishing example:

“How would you ever justify the fact that you sacrifice all the cats in the world to the cat that you feed at home every morning for years, whereas other cats die of hunger at every instant? Not to mention other people?”​[26]​

	The responsibility that I bear for my cat and my child, does not take away my responsibility for all the other animals and all the other people. In Derrida’s opinion, all these others are sacrificed with a sacrifice that can never be justified, because no difference should be made between different others: tout autre est tout autre, every other is wholly other, and in this absolute alterity all others are equal. Who obeys the moral call of the other, has to beg for forgiveness for ignoring and thus sacrificing all the others.​[27]​
	It is clear that responsibility is conceived here from the beginning as infinite. The finiteness of human existence is thought as a shortfall in relation to an absolute responsibility. The aporias of responsibility take place in the finite circumstances of finite existence against the background of an infinite obligation. It is especially the formula tout autre est tout autre that disturbs every concrete responsibility for another. This idea couples responsibility with the absolute alterity in the other. It is not this singular other, appearing to me while receding from her appearance, that makes me responsible; it is the receding alterity of the other, the general alterity and singularity in this other, that calls me to be responsible. In his later work, Derrida emphasizes no longer the concrete appearance of the other as other that speaks to me, but the abstract alterity of the other that does not appear and is now uncoupled from the concrete appearance of the other.​[28]​

	The aporias and double binds of ethicity are again reflected upon in Derrida’s analysis of the relation between the gift and economy. In his ‘ethics of the gift’, where ethics is considered to be a giving to the other, he strictly distinguishes gift and exchange. According to Derrida a gift is only a gift when nothing is given back, when there is no reciprocity. If a gift is followed by any reappropriation in whatever way, immediately or after a long time, then a gift is no longer a gift. But Derrida takes the economic calculation of the exchange in the broadest sense. Already the smallest sign of gratitude or an unconscious satisfaction of the giver with himself will pull the gift in an economic exchange and obliterate the gift. A pure and unconditional gift that is not taken up in an economic circulation is impossible. If you give something to another, you will anyway get something back. The gift initiates an economic circulation and thereby annihilates itself.​[29]​




4. Contrary effects of Derrida’s concept of responsibility

The basic problem of Derrida’s concept of responsibility is that it runs the risk of contrary effects. Such a risk is inherent in all Derrida’s deconstructive strategies. These strategies do not always have the same emphasis and outcome. Sometimes Derrida stresses the embeddedness, contextuality and finitude of concepts; he has also written texts with an emphasis on the absolute transcendence and indeterminibility of alterity. When, as is often the case in his later texts, the oscillatory movement between law and justice is oriented on the pure transcendence of absolute justice, when the analysis of the oscillation between gift and economy has its goal in the transcendental illusion of a pure gift, deconstructive strategies might reach the opposite of what they aim at – just like the metaphysical positions (foundation, origin, etc.) that are overturned in their opposites when they are in deconstruction.
	The pure formality of the openness for justice is meant to make room for new ethical and political approaches. But in his later work Derrida seems to push this strategy so far that in fact no room is left for any concrete new alternative, since every new proposal or alternative will immediately be criticized for not being open enough, because of the inevitable exclusion of alterity. A pure openness is open for everything new, as long as it is indeterminate or indeterminable – that means, it is open for nothing. When Derrida’s deconstructive strategy is restricting itself to the (quasi-)transcendental level of ethicity, it runs the risk of contrary effects on the level of ethics and political theory, by paralyzing every real effort for innovation. The more one-sided Derrida is oriented at indeterminable justice, the weaker his deconstructions will become.
	In the same way Derrida’s plea for an absolute responsibility can be counter-effective. By so strongly emphasizing that our responsibility will always fall too short, that our good decisions will never be good enough, he in fact raises the question whether the difference between good and bad is relevant after all. Derrida’s hyper-ethical avoiding of ‘good conscience’ runs the danger of stressing an inevitable bad conscience, which makes one wonder if it really matters whether we have a conscience at all.​[30]​





These contrary effects can be avoided, if the relation between infinity and finitude in responsibility will be reconsidered. Responsibility should not be taken initially as an infinite and absolute obligation and only at a later stage as contextual and finite. Its contextuality has to be taken seriously from the start. Finiteness and contextual embedding are not secondary but primary aspects of responsibility. It is exactly here, regarding the tense relation between finitude and infinity, that an important difference between Patočka and Derrida needs our attention.
	As we have seen, Patočka locates the birth of responsibility in the third movement of human existence, when man enters into a relation with his horizon, with the world as such and with his own existence as such. Since human existence and the world in its totality are not given as phenomena, their meaning will forever remain questionable. Ideas about the world and about existence therefore need to be accounted for. In other words, the lack of a metaphysical origin is the origin of responsibility. Responsibility can only be well understood in relation to an endless quest for its foundation and justification.
	So far, there are no differences between Derrida and Patočka with regard to the concept of responsibility. Both describe responsibility as linked to the awareness that there is no ultimate foundation and no absolute justice. Derrida, however, especially in his later texts, e.g. The Gift of Death, adds to this awareness the idea that responsibility should be absolute; or, in other words, the idea that responsibility is absolute in the first place and then is also finite. Its finiteness is taken as a deficit. There is no indication that Patočka would agree with this idea of an absolute responsibility. The finitude of responsibility, the fact that it is always situated, is not regarded to be a shortfall in relation to an infinite and absolute call or order. From the start, responsibility is taken by Patočka as situated, contextual and finite. Derrida wants to think responsibility as separate from this contextuality – it is exactly at this point that the problems in his concept of responsibility come to the fore.​[31]​
	This difference between Derrida and Patočka, between their concepts of responsibility, gets more perspective when we take a look at what they say about sacrifice. For Derrida the sacrifice of everyone and everything is inherent in every moral decision, it is a general characteristic of responsibility. Patočka, on the other hand, describes sacrifice as bound by a specific and concrete historical situation. A sacrifice is always at odds with the established order. It is exactly what cannot be understood by way of a general justification in terms of a categorical imperative or in terms of a necessary historical development. A sacrifice cannot be justified, but constitutes the core of human responsibility by being related to a good beyond any general justification. This ‘good’, however, is not something absolute and indeterminable but something that has to be accounted for in a specific moment and in a specific situation. It is, e.g., the human dignity for which dissidents like Andrej Sacharov and Alexander Solchenitsyn – and we may add here Patočka himself as well – have risked their life – and, as in the case of Patočka, even have given their life. Whereas Derrida emphasizes the general and unavoidable character of sacrifice, Patočka underlines its opposite, the fact that sacrifice necessarily is singular and situated. This is not only true of sacrifice but of all responsible decisions. Responsibility is always taken in a specific moment, for specific people, at a specific place, in a specific decision for which a specific account can be given.​[32]​
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